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An exemplary revolt of the central Middle Ages? Echoes of the first 
Lombard League across the Christian world around the year 1200 
 
There is some consensus among historians on the fact that the central middle ages played a 
pivotal role in the growth of European administrative institutions and the development of 
principles of accountability, consultation and public responsibility. This study engages with 
that scholarship by discussing some neglected viewpoints, that is, the degree of awareness 
and the perception across the Christian world of contemporary developments and local socio-
political variations, which will be tackled by focusing on the momentous conflict between the 
Lombard League and the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa of 1167-1183. There is 
no wide-raging study of that awareness, but this analysis argues that the representation of the 
conflict between Barbarossa and the League across Christendom could represent a valuable 
paradigm, which, moreover, challenges some significant noteworthy preconceptions. Indeed, 
scholarly considerations of the broader European power dynamics in the central middle ages 
and their legacy have tended to side-line Communal Italy (as scholarship often calls the 
northern half of the peninsula, dominated as it was by numerous quasi-independent city 
communes), and to neglect the conflict between the League (an association that united most 
of the city communes of the Po Plain) and Barbarossa as well as its status of revolt by 
subjects against their ruler.1   
Three main factors have traditionally led to that state of the research regarding the 
conflict between the League and Barbarossa, and they are the perceived exceptionalism of 
Communal Italy, its peculiar relationship with its emperor, and the challenge categorising the 
social features of that conflict. To start with, the Italian cities’ contribution to central 
medieval political culture has been primarily considered in the intellectual spheres, rather 
than in more practical political terms.2 That is largely due to the fact that the autonomy of the 
numerous Lombard city communes, and their degree of regional dominance were quite 
atypical in the European panorama of that time.3 Indeed, the claims of the German emperor 
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over Italy are considered as having been little more than notional, and his presence there 
sporadic at best. That has created the general perception that imperial authority was a foreign 
body in Communal Italy, which, in turn, has induced scholars to focus on the bilateral 
features of the conflicts between the Italian cities and the emperors, rather than hierarchical 
ones.4 Finally, on one side, the predominant urban features of Communal Italy have meant 
that historians have not fully seen its conflicts with the emperors as aristocratic revolts. On 
the other, the often-prevailing interpretation of twelve-century Lombard urban governments 
as oligarchic/aristocratic in nature, together with the existence of pro-imperial factions, has 
precluded the classification of those conflicts as popular revolts (this will be discussed more 
in depth later).  
This study challenges those views by arguing that, in the decades straddling the turn 
of the twelfth century, the conflict between the League and Barbarossa was one of the best 
known practical examples, if not the best known, across the Christian world, from England to 
Byzantium, of a successful rebellion by subjects against their ultimate ruler. Indeed, the way 
in which non-Italian sources described that conflict suggests that its distinctive urban 
communal features were not perceived as necessarily discordant with wider contemporary 
European and Mediterranean political culture. On the one hand, Barbarossa was far more 
present in northern Italy than any of his predecessors and successors, and he wished to 
“normalise” the region by enhancing his control and administration there to the detriment of 
the city communes. On the other, the varied and communal features of the opposition to him 
led to the League being generically portrayed as a rebellion by subjects as a whole against a 
despotic ruler or, in the case of German sources, as a reprehensible rebellion by unruly 
subjects against their legitimate ruler. In point of fact, the conflict between the League and 
Barbarossa reflected very well the above-mentioned developments that characterised 
European power dynamics in that period, representing a celebrated case in point of successful 
resistance against what was perceived as a tyrannical growth of royal government. 
After outlining the history of the conflict between the League and Barbarossa, this 
study will chart the awareness and representation of it outside the lands of the empire, from 
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England to Byzantium passing through France and Southern Italy, by mainly relying on 
historical works from the decades around the year 1200. That information will then be 
compared to representations of the League from within the empire, considering both Northern 
Italy and the vast area north of the Alps, from the border of Denmark to Bohemia. The 
findings will then be combined with a brief discussion of the socio-political features of the 
Lombard city communes and of the League through the lenses of non-Italian primary sources 
and of modern scholarship. Finally the impact of those features on the conflict against 
Barbarossa and on its portrayal by primary sources will be considered by focusing on some 
representative examples. 
 
Historical Background 
 
By the time of Barbarossa’s imperial coronation at Rome in 1154, the Kingdom of 
Italy/Lombardy (Regnum Italie or Lombardorum in the sources), which comprised the 
northern half of the peninsula, was a very loose commonwealth dominated by autonomous 
city communes under the distant authority of German Holy Roman Emperors/kings. That was 
especially the case in the Po Valley, then known as Lombardy (now that name applies to a 
fraction of that region), which throughout the Middle Ages featured probably the highest 
urban density in Europe. In the central Middle Ages the Lombard cities were growing fast, 
and that growth also took a political turn with the birth of autonomous communal 
governments between the end of the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth century, which, 
half a century later, had already reached a respectable level of maturity. At the peak of its 
success in 1172, for example, the Lombard League, despite its relatively small geographical 
size, included more than twenty city communes (civitates), all of which were fairly large by 
European standards, and each of which claimed authority over the surrounding lands. There 
were some territorial lordships in the region too, but very few matched any of its civitates in 
size and resources, and most of them orbited around civitates. The League, in any case, was 
the regional association of a land dominated by cities, rather than a mere league of towns. Its 
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full official name was Societas civitatum, locorum et hominum Lombardie, that is, the League 
of the cities, non-urban communities and men of Lombardy, with the term homines including 
territorial lords. Indeed, the League did not preclude membership to them: the Marquis 
Malaspina, for example, who was largely autonomous, consistently sided with the League 
after it was founded in 1167, and his standing within it was comparable to that of a civitas.5  
The Lombard League, however, was a complete novelty in that region, which was 
expressly created in order to repel the radical attempt by Barbarossa to enhance imperial 
authority in Italy, because no analogous general regional association had previously existed 
there. During his long reign, Barbarossa, who could count on unusually stable support in 
Germany, spent far more time in Italy than any of his predecessors. In the first half of the 
1160s he established an administrative structure in Lombardy whose pervasiveness was 
comparable to the most advanced central governments of the time, such as those of England 
and Sicily. He secured fortifications in key points and appointed officials (many of them 
Germans) to govern towns and districts, with special emphasis on the collection of imperial 
dues.6 A highpoint in the development of Barbarossa’s Italian ambitions was the famous Diet 
of Roncaglia in 1158, whose expansive definition of royal/imperial prerogatives (iura 
regalia) is commonly regarded as a milestone in the conceptualisation of public law in 
Western Europe.7 In order to implement his claims, though, Barbarossa first had to defeat the 
leading power in the region, that is, the city of Milan and its network of allies. The emperor 
achieved that in 1162, partly thanks to the support of Milan’s regional enemies, such as 
Cremona and Pavia, which led to the destruction of Milan that year. Indeed, Barbarossa’s 
domination across the region reached its peak between 1162 and 1167, though it is important 
to recognize that it was uneven: he granted a degree of autonomy to his supporters, while his 
officials had almost free rein to rule over former enemies.8  
Yet it is from former allies, like Cremona, where rebellion first stirred in 1164. The 
reasons for their revolt were multiple: they felt vexed by Barbarossa’s domination and by the 
exploitative behaviour of his agents, but they were also bribed by his enemies, like 
Byzantium, and supported by Pope Alexander III, who had taken the upper hand in the papal 
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schism that had started in 1159 (while Barbarossa was the principal backer of a series of anti-
popes). By 1168, the rebellion against Barbarossa had enveloped the whole of Lombardy, 
leading to the reconstruction of Milan, the creation of the League, and the obliteration of 
Barbarossa’s governing structure across the region. After the League’s victory at the Battle of 
Legnano in 1176 and the Peace of Venice in 1177 between Barbarossa and Alexander III 
(which also entailed negotiations between the League, the king of Sicily and Barbarossa), the 
League and the emperor reached a written settlement at the Peace of Constance in 1183.9   
The Peace of Constance, however, was not a capitulation by Barbarossa but a 
compromise, which aimed to set the future balance of power in the region. On one side, it 
recognised an extensive level of self-government for so many Lombard communes (not all of 
which were included in the settlement) that these freedoms practically became a general 
benchmark of autonomy for the entire region.10 On the other, the Peace of Constance 
acknowledged imperial superiority over Lombardy. That superiority was embodied by a set of 
reserved prerogatives, such as appellate jurisdiction, the duty of city consuls to take an oath of 
fealty to the emperor and to seek investiture from him, as well as the duty to help the emperor 
in times of need and during his coronation journey to Rome, and imperial control over some 
districts.11  
The Peace of Constance worked well until the death of Emperor Henry VI in 1197, 
when a long struggle for the succession ensued, lasting for over two decades and vastly 
eroding the remaining imperial prerogatives in Italy.12 When Emperor Frederick II, having 
stabilised his rule in Germany and in southern Italy (a maternal inheritance), turned his 
attention to Lombardy in 1226, a long conflict ensued with the renewed League that 
continued until his death in 1250 and beyond.13 The fortunes of the empire in Italy then 
rapidly and lastingly declined, but Lombardy notionally remained under imperial sovereignty, 
emperors intermittently paying heed to it now and again, and the Peace of Constance 
continued to be considered and to celebrated as the legal foundation of the autonomy of the 
Lombard cities until the end of the middle ages and beyond.14  
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Representations of the Conflict Outside the Empire  
(England, France, Southern Italy and Byzantium) 
 
In late 1167, John of Salisbury sent a letter to William Brito, sub-prior of Christ Church in 
Canterbury. In it, after outlining the collapse of Barbarossa’s rule in Lombardy and his 
narrow escape to Germany, John asked: ‘Why do I tell you what you know already? 
Everywhere news of this is being loudly proclaimed. Everyone, I think, knows it, save only 
those perhaps who live apart from the crisis of the age, exiles in their own home’.15 John’s 
statement is confirmed by the vast coverage of the conflict in historical works produced 
across Christendom from the last quarter of the twelfth century through the first quarter of the 
thirteenth. Substantial coverage of those events can be found, for example, in the work of the 
Byzantine John Kinnamos (d. 1185 circa, secretary and biographer of Emperor Manuel 
Komnenos) and of the southern Italian Romuald Guarna (d. 1178, archbishop of Salerno and 
envoy for the King of Sicily, including at the Peace of Venice), but also in those of English 
authors such as William of Newburgh (d. 1198 circa, an Augustinian canon from the priory of 
Newburgh), Robert of Torigni (d. 1186, abbot of Mont Saint-Michel in Normandy), and 
Ralph of Diceto (d. 1202 circa, dean of Saint Paul’s Cathedral in London, who visited Italy in 
the 1170s during a diplomatic mission for King Henry of England in the aftermath of the 
murder of the archbishop of Canterbury Thomas Becket16), and in an anonymous French 
chronicle from Laon (completed around 1218). Passing references can be found in other 
works from those countries, and especially from France and England, including the chronicle 
of Ralph Niger (d. around 1217, theologian and cleric), that of Richard of Poiters (d. 1174, a 
monk at Cluny), an anonymous English eyewitness account of the Peace of Venice, and the 
historical/political poetry of Bertran de Born (d. 1215, a lord from the Limousin).17 This list 
does not claim to be exhaustive, but it is certainly representative of the spread of the fame of 
the revolt. 
Despite coming from different corners of the Christian world, these sources are 
remarkably consistent in presenting the conflict as a struggle to preserve time-honoured rights 
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against a tyrannical ruler intent in trampling them, with ethnic issues exacerbating tensions. 
Their terminology is also remarkably consistent across the board, key words among them 
being libertas (freedom) for the objective of the Lombards, and insolentia (want of 
moderation, arrogance, but also unusualness) for Barbarossa’s actions. Scholarship has spent 
rivers of ink on medieval views on libertas, but the use of the term insolentia, which these 
sources portray as its nemesis, has largely passed unnoticed. Differently from many later 
medieval revolts, these appeals to libertas did not have a socially charged dimension.18 Yet, 
as in some late medieval revolts, they took a truly communal nature. As it will be further 
discussed later, that evidence suggest that the distinction between community rights defined 
by elites as opposed to those defined by commoners was far less clear than scholarship has 
often taken it to be.19 Indeed, those sources ascribe the Lombard uprising to urban 
communities coalesced into a general regional association of the emperor’s subjects, which is 
sometimes presented as capable of collective actions in its own terms. Overall, the libertas of 
these sources is a collection of traditional communal rights regarding self-rule, taxation, 
property holding, but it is also the very freedom from arbitrary rule that the term insolentia 
typified.  
Starting in the Christian East, we see that Kinnamos explained Lombard disaffection 
towards Barbarossa, ‘king of the Germans’, with the fact that, out of lust for power and 
insatiable greed, he strove to undo effortlessly what had been long established by time and 
custom, especially by laying claim to money. This pushed various Lombard cities, of which 
Kinnamos named some, to seek help against him and eventually to go over to the Byzantine 
emperor.20  
On the other side of Christendom, comparable arguments can be found in Anglo-
Norman sources, which are particularly rich in references to the League.21 Ralph Niger 
mentioned that the Lombards toppled the insolence and oppression (insolentia and 
opressiones) of Barbarossa and of his Germans.22 On similar lines, William of Newburgh, 
who called Frederick the ‘German and Italian emperor’ (Teutonicus atque Italicus imperator), 
and explained the conflict with the fact that, after his destruction of the rebel (rebellem) city 
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of Milan, he acted insolently (insolentius ageret) and that the Lombards could not tolerate the 
resulting ‘German yoke’ (jugum Alemannicum).23 According to Ralph of Diceto, the 
Lombards were Barbarossa’s subjects, but he invaded Italy in order to cast his name above 
those of all the other magnates of the earth; he found his main obstacle in the city of Milan, 
which enjoyed immunity from extraordinary obligations, was conscious of its libertas and 
thus refused to acknowledge to him more than the customary dues; eventually the people of 
Milan, Piacenza, Brescia and Verona decided to defend the libertas of their homeland (patria) 
with their lives;24 following his defeat at Legnano, judging that Italy was rebellious to him 
(sibi rebellem intelligens) and that he could not face the Lombards on the battlefield again 
without recovering his strength, he moved to Germany.25 The anonymous English eyewitness 
of the Peace of Venice underlined that the emperor had introduced grievous and previously 
unheard of customs in northern Italy (importunas et antea inauditas consuetudines) as the 
cause of Lombard opposition to him.26  
The southern Italian Romuald of Salerno wrote that Barbarossa, after his victory over 
Milan, had Lombardy at his will and turned it into his domain (which probably referred to 
Barbarossa’s reclamations of what he perceived were usurped public estates and assets) by 
appointing officials in cities and castles, the result being that, by supporting the emperor 
against Milan, the Lombards had placed themselves in servitude to the Germans.27 Then at the 
Peace of Venice (more on which later), the representatives of the Lombards assured that they 
recognized the emperor’s ancient dues and were happy to comply with them, but they 
categorically refused to relinquish the libertas which they held by hereditary right from their 
ancestors, and which they were ready to defend with their lives, equating the alternative to 
servitude.28  
Moving to France, the anonymous chronicler of Laon mentioned Barbarossa’s 
growing power in the region and the destruction of Milan in 1162, but also that, weary of his 
insolentia, the Lombards decided to submit their kingdom to the Byzantine emperor and 
shortly after this entered into similar negotiations with King Henry II of England.29 Indeed, 
according to this chronicle, ‘as they say’, Barbarossa later took the cross because he was 
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filled with remorse for the injuries he had inflicted on the Lombards.30  
Those authors clearly viewed the outcome of the struggle as favourable to the 
Lombards. Kinnamos’ work ends in 1176, but he had lost interest in northern Italy after 
stating that many of the main cities of the region had gone over from Barbarossa to his 
emperor (which came to nothing in the end).31 According to Ralph Niger, the Lombards, 
having driven the oppression off, obtained ‘greater liberty’ (maiorem libertatem).32 Ralph 
Diceto inserted in his work a letter sent by the Milanese to the Bolognese announcing the 
triumph of Legnano, and, although he did not mention the final outcome of the conflict, his 
work implies that a settlement had been reached, because it mentions the wedding of the 
future Emperor Henry VI with Constance of Sicily, together with the resulting coronation 
ceremony, that took place at Milan (by then the leading city of the League) in 1186.33 For 
William of Newburgh, the Lombards eventually recovered their ancient liberty (in libertatem 
se pristinam receperunt), and he also implied that a settlement was reached when he 
mentioned how Frederick made his son Henry king of the Lombards.34 Robert of Torigni 
ended his account of the conflict with the crushing victory of the League at Legnano.35 
Romuald of Salerno died before the Peace of Constance, but he also described the Lombard 
triumph at Legnano, and his work is one of the best sources on the negotiations between 
Barbarossa and the League during the Peace of Venice. The chronicle of Laon closes its 
account of the conflict with Barbarossa’s calamitous failure at the siege of Alessandria of 
1174-5.36  
Indeed, the sympathy of these non-imperial sources is largely on the side of the 
Lombards, and criticism of the their uprising is hard to come by, which is perhaps surprising, 
given how many of those sources came from countries with strong central governments, such 
as England, southern Italy, and Byzantium. Some sources do highlight the urban nature of 
Lombard society and its unusual degree of libertas, and some of them also consider 
Barbarossa’s point of view, but none of them particularly overstress those distinctive features. 
The best example of such comments probably comes from Romuald of Salerno, who noted 
that, before Barbarossa, the Lombards enjoyed an extraordinary degree of liberty when 
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compared to other nations (‘inter alias nationes libertatis singularitate gaudebant’), but he 
also later stated that in his 1170s campaigns, Barbarossa took action against the ‘injury’ 
(iniuria) he had received from the Lombards.37 Similar, but perhaps more judgemental, views 
can be found in the work of William of Newburgh, who described as immoderata (which 
probably means excessive and extravagant here) the libertas which the Lombards enjoyed 
before Barbarossa, when they had largely freed themselves from the emperor; indeed, for 
William the Lombard people (gens) was restless and warlike (inquieta, bellicose), as well as 
superba for its number of cities and strength, an adjective which in a bad sense means 
arrogant and in a good one outstanding;38 in any case, the Lombards do seem to have 
redeemed themselves in William’s eyes when he notes that the Milanese, fighting against 
Barbarossa, converted ‘the desire of dominion [over other Lombards] into an obstinate 
defense of liberty’, and how they fought back against Barbarossa’s insolentia.39  
The French troubadour Bertran de Born approved of the covenant formed by the 
Lombards in one of his poems, in which he noticed how the Gascons had similarly coalesced 
against their king (Henry II of England or his son Henry the Young King) (‘Li Gascon si son 
acordat / entr’ elhs et ves lui revelat / quon aissilh de Lombardia … D’aitan lur trac 
guaranteia’).40 Other poems by Bertran also approvingly alluded to the conflict between the 
League and Barbarossa, one portraying the situation in Limousin as the ‘little Lombardy” (‘Sa 
pauca Lombardia’) of Count Aimar of Limoges.41  
The most sympathetic with the emperor among these authors seems to have been 
Robert of Torigni, but he has no particularly harsh comment for the Lombards, especially 
when compared to the harshness of the German sources discussed below. After mentioning 
that the emperor had subjected Lombardy to his will – a statement which might harbour 
negative overtones of arbitrary rule – Robert underlined how that had brought peace and 
security for natives and strangers as well as a restoration of royal revenues; perhaps surprise, 
hinting to some measure of criticism against the Lombards, can be detected in his prose when 
he notices how ‘on the other hand’ (iterum), the cities of the Veronese March rebelled in 1164 
(a prologue to the Lombard League).42 
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Those sources generally portray the conflict between the League and Barbarossa as a 
collective struggle by a regional community, even a people, that is, the Lombardi whose 
constituent parts were urban communities. Some sources acknowledge that some Lombard 
cities sided with the emperor, but they usually point out they were a small minority, which 
justifies their consistent use of the collective ethnic name Lombardi to describe Barbarossa’s 
opponents. William of Newburgh called those Lombards a gens and Romuald of Salerno a 
natio.43 Robert of Torigni provided a sketch of the political and religious configuration of the 
region, stating that it was divided into three archdioceses (Milan, Ravenna and Genoa) and 
twenty-five cities.44 He subsequently remarked that all the twenty-five cities of Lombardy 
defected from the emperor apart from Pavia and Vercelli, and that the Lombardi won the 
Battle of Legnano.45  
While Anglo-Norman and Byzantine sources did not enter into the details of the bond 
between the Lombard cities, French, German and southern Italian ones describe it as a 
coniuratio capable of major public collective actions. That reflected the structure of the 
League, which partially filled the power vacuum left by the conflict with its emperor and his 
papal excommunication, the result being that, to some extent, the League even usurped 
imperial prerogatives, such as judging appeals against the sentences of local judges and 
recognising urban status to the new centre of Alessandria.46 Coniuratio literally means 
collective oath, or sworn alliance, but it often had the negative connotation of plot or 
conspiracy (from which the modern Italian congiura comes from).47 Yet, overall, the way in 
which the sources examined above explained the conflict, and their general lack of other 
negative comments on the Lombards (which, as we shall see, are abundant in German 
sources), suggest ruling out that negative connotation. 
Romuald, for example, wrote that almost all of the Lombards made a coniuratio 
against the emperor.48 Bertran de Born simply refers to it as a collective agreement among the 
Lombards (‘si son acordat / entr’ elhs’).49 The chronicle of Laon describes the Lombardi as 
taking deliberations (deliberaverunt) on matters such as offering the Lombard Kingdom to 
other rulers, although it also notices how the Lombards were divided into an anti-imperial 
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group led by Milan and a smaller number of imperial supporters, describing the former as a 
Milanese confederacy (‘confederatio mediolanice’), or ‘the cities that had formed a coniuratio 
together with Milan’ (‘urbes que mediolano coniuraverant’).50 This focus on Milanese 
leadership might have been influenced by developments after the Battle of Legnano, and 
particularly during the first quarter of the thirteenth century, when the chronicle of Laon was 
produced, because the Milanese influence over the League took time to build up after the 
city’s reconstruction.51 On similar lines, according to the Chronica Regia Coloniensis, which 
is more fully discussed below, a vast coniuratio covering the whole of Lombardy was made 
against the emperor, and in 1175 it declared a public war (‘bellum publicum’) against him, 
gathering an extraordinary mass of people from all over the region.52 Likewise, an addition to 
the chronicle of Richard of Poitiers reports that Barbarossa’s plan to submit the whole of Italy 
to his rule was foiled by the fact that all the Italian cities (read here northern Italy), apart from 
Pavia, formed a coniuratio against him with the approbation of Pope Alexander III.53  
The interest and sympathy of non-Italian sources for the League was certainly 
connected to the conflict between Pope Alexander III and Barbarossa. Apart from Bertran de 
Born, all the authors mentioned above were, after all, clerics, as it was the norm in that period 
outside Italy. Lombardy traditionally played a crucial geopolitical role in the relations 
between empire and papacy, whose conflicts, in turn, inevitably touched the whole of 
Christendom and interlaced with a myriad of other local and regional issues across it. The 
conflict between Barbarossa and Alexander had started as a papal schism, but well before the 
creation of the League most of Christendom had already accepted Alexander, to whom the 
League became the principal ally, and who had excommunicated Barbarossa.54 Allegiance to 
the series of anti-popes who opposed Alexander was restricted to Barbarossa’s areas of 
control, especially Germany and central Italy.55 It is probably not a coincidence that, as we 
shall see, German sources are also the only ones across Christendom that consistently 
criticised the League. In addition to the conflict between empire and papacy, there was the 
fact that the resources that Barbarossa was gathering by controlling an area as rich as 
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Lombardy threatened to upset continental and Mediterranean balances of power, and thus 
greatly worried his neighbours (Kinnamos mentioned that explicitly in the account mentioned 
above). On the other hand, the sources examined above undoubtedly treat the uprising on its 
own terms and do not confuse it with the papal schism or with the conflict between pope and 
emperor.  
 
Representations of the League within the Empire  
(Northern Italy and Germany) 
 
The representation of the League outside the Empire was far closer to that by Italian sources 
than to German ones, whose attitude clearly stands out from the rest of the surviving sources.  
Among Italian historical works, one of the most exhaustive explanations for the 
Lombard uprising comes from the chronicles of Lodi, a city which originally supported the 
emperor, but was forced to join the League in its early stages and then consistently sided with 
it for the rest of the conflict. One of their authors, the lay judge Acerbo Morena (an imperial 
supporter who died in the epidemic which forced Barbarossa to retreat from Rome in 1167) 
blamed the massive burdens (‘enormiter gravatos’) that imperial representatives (‘missi 
imperatoris’) imposed over the cities which gave birth to the Veronese League in 1164, but 
also the ‘pecunia Venetorum’ (that is, the bribes mentioned above, Venice being the conduit 
of the financial incentives from Byzantium and Norman Sicily).56 His anonymous 
continuator, who wrote after Lodi joined the League, stated that the Lombards were not used 
to the intrusive imperial presence introduced by Barbarossa: accustomed to living freely and 
comfortably, they suddenly found themselves victims of a plethora of uncustomary taxes and 
expropriations, which led to open opposition against the emperor and to the creation of the 
League by 1167-8.57 On the same line was Cardinal Boso (supporter and biographer for Pope 
Alexander III), who pointed to arbitrary extortions, expropriations, and also sexual violence 
by imperial officers, and described how, during the negotiations between League and emperor 
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of 1175, some mediators likened Frederick’s deeds to a lord who has taken by force what 
belongs to his serfs by right.58  
The most stirring Italian account, however, comes from a Milanese source eloquently 
known as ‘the story of the oppression of Lombardy’ (Narratio de Longobardiae obpressione), 
which describes the misfortunes of the Milanese in the years between the destruction of their 
city in 1162 and their return to it in 1167. During this time, they had been dispersed in 
settlements in the surrounding countryside and found themselves under the rule of imperial 
representatives who clearly treated them as defeated recidivist rebels, making them provide 
free labour, extorting money, and forcing expropriations in various unpleasant ways.59 The 
comments on expropriations closely recall Romuald’s passage according to which Barbarossa 
transformed most of Lombardy into his domain. Documentary evidence from Piacenza, which 
was in a similar position to Milan, would confirm that the claims of Lombard writers were not 
just rhetoric.60 
Those accounts largely mirror the appeals, found in the documentary evidence of the 
creation of the League and of its negotiations with the emperor, to the by en large unwritten 
good customs (‘salvis rationibus et bonis usibus’), which in the eyes of the Lombards 
justified their control of what Barbarossa perceived as public, read imperial, assets.61 A letter 
sent to Archbishop Becket of Canterbury by his representatives at the papal curia in May 
1164, on the eve of the uprising of the Veronese League, exemplifies how that information 
travelled outside Italy: it noticed how relations between the emperor and the Lombard cities 
had deteriorated so much that they were threatening to abandon him if he did not change his 
tyrannical attitude and adopt a more civilised one, so that they could regain the liberty they 
had enjoyed under his predecessors (‘nisi deponat tirrannidem et civiles induat mores, ut 
liberi esse possint, sicut in diebus aliorum imperatorum’).62  
In works produced in the Italian schools of law and rhetoric the status quo as it 
existed before Barbarossa was also justified by pointing to the privileges (known as Ius 
Italicum) that Italy had enjoyed within the ancient Roman empire of which Barbarossa 
claimed to be the heir. Those privileges mainly featured exemption from tributes, but they 
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implied far more than that, because they also had strong communal elements (the Corpus 
Iuris Civilis cites them in relation to grants to non-Italian cities). Indeed, they originally 
derived from the identification of the Italian peninsula with the Roman state itself, which 
meant that Italians were not mere subjects of the emperor (a position which applied to the 
inhabitants of the provinces of the empire, who were subjects by right of conquest), but 
Roman citizens of the highest rate, which secured personal property and protected from 
arbitrary jurisdiction.63  
No explicit references to the ancient Ius Italicum can be found in chronicles and in 
the surviving records of the negotiations between the League and Barbarossa. Those 
references were rather part of a learned debate linked to the participation of jurists from the 
law schools of Bologna to Barbarossa’s Diet of Roncaglia of 1158, where they had helped 
shaping imperial claims by connecting them to the Roman law of Justinian Corpus Iuris 
Civilis. That compilation was also the main source of information regarding the Ius Italicum, 
which other jurists and rhetoricians then used to criticise the findings of their colleagues at 
Roncaglia.64 Indeed, a wider debate existed at that time on the relationship between unwritten 
customs, written laws and new legislation.65 Ultimately, however, the intentions of the 
upholders of the Ius Italicum were the same as those based on good custom, but they 
preferred to back them with Roman law.  
At the same time, it should not been taken for granted that those learned arguments 
were necessarily confined to academic ivory towers. As jurists helped Barbarossa at 
Roncaglia, Lombard schools of law and rhetoric (which attracted students from all over 
Western Europe) often had a symbiotic relationship with Italian communal governments, and 
that was especially the case at Bologna, which a decade after Roncaglia became a consistent 
member of the League.66 In fact, references to the Roman heritage and to ideas of citizenship 
in relation to the Lombard city communes can be found in some contemporary sources that 
will be examined shortly, and most notably those of the German Otto of Freising and of the 
Italian Boncompagno da Signa, the latter in a work which he publicly read to the  township of 
Ancona. 
 16 
Regarding the bond among the insurgents, Italian sources sometimes feature the term 
coniuratio, but more often concordia (agreement or harmony) or societas civitatum (league of 
cities), which are interchangeable but not totally synonymous. The term concordia had 
intrinsically positive connotations, and societas was quite neutral, but again, like in non-
imperial sources, coniuratio did not necessarily entail negative implications. The work of the 
continuator of Morena, for example, states that by 1168 the cities which had already formed a 
coniuratio (‘iam coniurate fuerant’) evolved into a corporate association (‘atque insimul 
unum corpus omnes effecto sunt’), which coincided with the creation of the governing college 
of the rectors of the League and the appearance of its official name.67 In that case coniuratio 
was probably simply meant to refer to a pre-incorporation stage, when the League was only a 
sworn multilateral agreement.68  
The contrast between Italian and non-imperial sources on one side and those from the 
empire north of the Alps (from as far north as Schleswig-Holstein, on the border with 
Denmark, to as far east as Bohemia) could not be starker, because the latter unmistakably and 
consistently portrayed the League as the villain. Indeed, with the partial exception of 
Burchard von Ursperg (who also used the term insolentia referring to Barbarossa’s agents), 
they feature no remarks concerning uncustomary rule and oppression by Barbarossa. Vincent 
of Prague (d. 1170, a notary and canon from Prague who took part to Barbarossa’s Italian 
expeditions), whose work ends just before the formation of the League, remarked that, after 
the fall of Milan in 1162, Barbarossa exercised his authority over the whole of Italy, which 
trembled in his presence, and he appointed his potestates over the Italian cities, the result 
being that ‘what he wished in Lombardy he did’.69 The latter echoes some of the statements 
considered above, but it was clearly meant as praise for Barbarossa’s might, because Vincent 
consistently sided with him throughout his work. The Chronica Regia Coloniensis (written 
around 1200 by an unidentified canon from Cologne) also remarks that, after the destruction 
of Milan, the whole of Lombardy bowed to Barbarossa’s will. 70 Gottfried of Viterbo (d. 
1202, a member of the imperial court) praised imperial rule in that period for bringing peace 
and suitable royal revenues.71 Only Burchard of Ursperg (provost of the Swabian 
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Premonstratensian monastery of Ursperg, who was writing around 1230) stated that, when the 
League was created, the Lombards expelled the iudices whom Barbarossa had appointed 
throughout Lombardy because of the ‘insolentias’ with which those Germans had behaved. 
Incidentally, Burchard’s work features one of the most informative and balanced account of 
the Peace of Constance, mentioning that Barbarossa reached an agreement with the Lombards 
regarding what they owed him, and that since then they had been refusing to do more than 
what that written settlement prescribed.72 
German authors also referred to the League more consistently as a rebellion, and they 
often described it as a conspiratio, a term far less ambiguously negative (from which the 
English ‘conspiracy’ comes from) than coniuratio, as confirmed by frequent derogatory 
comments on the Lombards. The Chronica Regia Coloniensis calls the League a coniuratio, 
mentions the perfidia of the Milanese while reporting its reconstruction without the emperor’s 
permission, and describes the new city of Alessandria (a member of the League) as a 
collection of petty thieves, robbers and serfs freshly escaped from their lords, to which the 
League lent its support.73 For Gottfried of Viterbo the Lombards conspired to form a sworn 
rebellion (‘conspirant ligures … rebellio iurata’), the League was the revival of the previous 
rebellion by Milan, a city which he had called barbarous, arrogant, untamed and fully 
rebellious (seva, superba, fera, tota rebellis), but the Lombards as a whole were a bad rabble 
(plebs mala), their deeds crimes (crimina), and their arrogance repressed all royal rights and 
replaced them with self-rule.74 The verb ‘rebellant’ was used by Rahewin and the Annales 
Magdeburgenses (from the last quarter of the twelfth century), which calls the Lombards ‘a 
perfidious people deserving reproach/chastisement’ (gentem perfidam digna 
animadversione).75 The Chronica Slavorum of Helmold of Bosau (d. 1177 circa, priest at 
Bosau in Schleswig-Holstein) states that, with the destruction of Milan, fear for Barbarossa 
temporarily put an end to Lombard rebellions, who had so ill-treated his predecessors, but 
then the Lombards unanimously conspiraverunt against the emperor.76 Despite his relatively 
balanced explanation of the Lombard uprising, Burchard of Ursbergh also described the 
League as a conspiratio.77 
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The representation of the League by those German sources reflected closely that by 
the imperial court, from whose propaganda the inhabitants of the ultramontane empire 
obtained at least some of their information about it. The appendix to Rahewin’s work, for 
example, states that in 1167 Barbarossa sent letters throughout the empire denouncing the 
‘rebellionem Italorum’.78 This is probably a reference to the extant letter in which Barbarossa 
highlighted how the Lombards had rebelled against him as well as against the ‘Teutonicorum 
Imperio’, with no good reason or fault by the emperor (‘sine causa’ and ‘sine aliqua 
praecedenti culpa’), but because of the malitia and perfidia of the Italians. That is exactly 
how the German sources examined above described those events.79  
 
The Socio-Political Features of the Lombard City Communes  
 
The sources considered above do not ostensibly discuss the situation within the Lombard city 
communes, and for that we must turn primarily to the German Otto of Freising (d. 1158, 
bishop of Freising and a close relative of Barbarossa himself), who, interestingly, explained it 
by adopting the dichotomy libertas versus insolentia as well, and died just before the 
beginning of the papal schism. That means that Otto did not see the formation of the League, 
but he did witness the early Italian campaigns of Barbarossa against Milan, and it was in 
order to explain them that he left what is probably the most compelling cross-sectional 
panoramic view of twelfth-century Communal Italy.80  
While Otto outlined the regional domination by cities and their relations with the 
emperor, he also discussed their form of government and their internal social stratification. 
Regarding politics, Otto noticed how, following their ancient Roman heritage, the Lombards 
loved libertas (‘Denique libertatem tantopere affectant’) and rejected the insolence of power 
(‘ut potestatis insolentiam fugiendo’), so that, rather then by masters, they preferred to be 
ruled by officers called consuls (‘consulum potius quam imperantium regantur arbitrio’), 
who were drawn from different social groups and, lest they exceeded their bounds by lust for 
power, held short-term office.81 On one side, Otto criticised the relative social mobility of the 
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Lombard city communes, as when he mentioned how they offered ‘knighthoods and grades of 
distinction to young men of inferior status or workers of the vile mechanical arts, whom other 
peoples barred like the pest’.82 On the other, he obviously admired the overall results of that 
Lombard system, which, he stated, meant that the Lombards surpassed all other cities [or 
body politics] of the world in riches and power (‘Ex quo factum est, ut caeteris orbis 
civitatibus divitiis et potentia praemineant’).83 That, however had a dark side, because, while 
the Lombards claimed to adhere to the law [Otto most probably referred to Roman law there], 
they forgot their ancient nobility, and in reality disdained the law by disregarding their 
rightful ultimate ruler, that is, the emperor, to whom they should have displayed a voluntary 
deference of obedience. The result was that the Lombards did not behave like citizens [Otto 
used the term civis, which in this case seems to refer to the concept of the Roman citizen 
rather than a mere town dweller], but like an enemy (‘adversarius’) who needed to be 
subjugated by force of arms [which seems to reflect the lawyers’ distinction between Italians 
and conquered provincials in the Roman empire mentioned above]. That excused the emperor 
for such actions in the sight of God. Barbarossa’s predecessors had allowed that situation to 
worsen with their neglect, but he planned to put remedy to it.84  
Otto’s account can be coupled with passages from the Policraticus, which was one of 
the most influential political works from the central Middle Ages. Scholarship seems to have 
utterly overlooked those passages, but they engage with themes that are similar to those of 
Otto’s work by presenting non-German points of view on them. Indeed, they present on the 
Lombard cities as epitomes of popular sovereignty, and, as many of the other works here 
considered, feature the dichotomy libertas versus insolentia too. John travelled to Italy in 
several occasions, and his Policraticus includes a conversation he had with an anonymous 
person who hosted him at Piacenza. In it the host presented argued that as long as the 
inhabitants of the Italian cities cherished peace and justice, they rejoiced in liberty (libertas) 
and peace; indeed, the merits of the people make princely regimes superfluous or cause them 
to be administered with the greatest mildness (‘merita populi omnem evacuant principatum 
aut eum faciunt esse mitissimum’); conversely people’s sins bring hypocrites to reign, Roman 
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arrogance and the German fury being examples of how God punished the Italians when they 
strayed away from the above-mentioned merits.85 The terms used for Roman arrogance, 
‘fastus’, was a synonym of insolentia, and, together with the ‘furor Teutonicus’, in all 
probability referred to the emperor. As with Otto of Freising, John of Salisbury wrote the 
Policraticus in the late 1150s too, before the beginning of the papal schism, and roughly a 
decade before his letters commenting on Lombard affairs mentioned above.86 Therefore those 
passages from the Policraticus probably commented on Barbarossa’s early campaigns against 
Milan, of which Piacenza was the closest ally in the region.87 
Although the other sources examined above do not explicitly discuss the internal 
features of the Lombard cities’ communal governments, their representation of the Lombards’ 
acts as undertaken collectively by a regional community constituted by urban ones suggests 
that they took for granted at least some of the featured that Otto and John depicted. On the 
other hand, the Annales Magdeburgenses represented the League as a rebellion by ‘Italici 
principes’.88 What those annals actually meant with principes is open to interpretation. In the 
light of the little role that territorial lords played in the League, one is left wondering whether 
principes simply meant the leading powers in the region by comparing the city communes to 
collective forms of lordship. Yet it is also perhaps possible that it referred to the local elite 
that largely controlled the Italian city communes. 
Scholarship has largely ignored these passages from John of Salisbury and the 
Annales Magdeburgenses, but the seeming contrast between the populus of the former and the 
principes of the latter echoes the existence of opposite scholarly traditions regarding the 
social and institutional makeup of the Italian city communes. One school of thought portrays 
twelfth-century city communes as primordial models of representative institutions, and the 
other as oligarchies dominating urban masses.89 It is now generally accepted that the city 
communes of that period acted as public entities; after all, they described themselves in terms 
such as res publica, commune, or civitas. On the other, in the second half of the twentieth 
century scholarship focused in particular attention on the local aristocracies and elites called 
milites (usually translated as knights or consular aristocracy, as opposed to the populus, or 
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pedites whose members fought on foot), who controlled and ran the communal governments. 
In some cases that scholarship portrayed the rise of the city communes as the conquest of 
cities by the rural nobility and its integration with urban mercantile, administrative and 
financial elites. In this approach, the city communes are effectively understood as collective 
lordships based on the concord between aristocratic families, rather than on the concord of the 
cives as a whole. This view resonates with suggestions to replace the use of the term state 
with lordship for the Middle Ages, especially for this period.90  
More recently, however, this focus on the urban aristocracy has been attacked as 
unjustifiably slighting the public and more inclusive features of twelfth century-Italian 
communal governments.91 This has led to renewed attention upon issues such as offices, 
judicial and fiscal administrations, assembly politics, and the expansion of rhetorical and legal 
education as the forgers of a distinctive communal political culture. After all, the milites 
themselves were a relatively fluid, porous and diverse group at that time, whose composition 
and features varied from town to town, and who did not completely monopolise the running 
of the communes. Consuls did exchange oaths with the assembly of all the cives, who 
gathered for that and other important purposes in the main square of the cities. The relatively 
high cohesion of Lombard urban communities of that time, which was quite remarkable in 
comparison to previous and later periods, is suggestive: indeed, overall, their communal 
governments had been created out of broad compromise among the various components of 
local communities.92 It was a few decades after the end of the conflict with Barbarossa, for 
example, that the Italian cities started to be lacerated by clashes between the milites, or 
magnates, and the populus.93 Overall, this evidence implies that communal institutions were 
not as frail and diminutive in the twelfth century as has often been assumed. This does not 
deny the preponderance of the local elites, but integrates their dominance within a more 
complex communal setting. Indeed, in many ways that re-evaluation of twelfth-century 
communal institutions does some justice to the account by Otto of Freising, and suggest that 
those by John of Salisbury and the Annales Magdeburgenses did not necessarily represent 
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contrasting images, but reflected the complexity of the Italian cities and the awareness of it 
outside Italy. 
 
The League’s Approach to Politics 
 
The historiography on the League presents similar dichotomies to that of the city communes, 
but in its case they are less a product of opposing schools, than a reflection of changes in 
scholarship over time related to contemporary political experiences. While, at the beginning 
of the eighteenth century, the League could be portrayed as a precursor of the French 
revolution, it took stronger and stronger nationalistic overtones during the Risorgimento (the 
movement that unified the Italian peninsula and expelled the Austrian empire). Then the topic 
started to go out of fashion after the creation of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861, to which the 
League bore little geographic or qualitative correspondence, and it never recovered its 
previous popularity. Although the Fascist regime named military units after the Battle of 
Legnano, it did not pay much attention to the League itself. Post-War scholarship has 
regularly mentioned the League, but mostly in passing and primarily to debunk what 
remained of its Risorgimento myth, which still lingers in popular perceptions. The political 
party of the Lega Nord/Lega Lombarda, for  example, has adopted a warped version of that 
Risorgimento myth in the last decades of the twentieth century, switching, as opponent, the 
German emperor with the Italian central government and with southern Italian influences, 
while, most recently, it has focused its attention on criticising the European Union.94  
To some extent the shadow of the Risorgimento still lingers in academia as well, and 
it shoulders the responsibility for dictating the evaluation of the League in terms of 
nationhood and state formation, in which it has always been found wanting, or simply in 
terms of preservation of the Lombard city communes (viewed as they are as an early stage for 
the city states of the Italian Renaissance).95 On the other hand, the tacit corollary of the 
above-mentioned focus on urban aristocracies was that the League was represented as little 
more than a fleeting alliance of petty local oligarchic interests. The recent re-evaluation of 
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twelfth-century communal governments has rather focused on how the experience of the 
League helped to collectively consolidate them by rejecting Barbarossa’s threat and by 
improving political and institutional integration across the region.96   
Those views have overshadowed how the League attracted attention as a case of 
rejection of a despotic princely government, as well as how it also stood for, and, as will be 
shown in a moment, put a spotlight on a certain approach to the exercise of power that 
reflected the experience of the city communes, as opposed to the top down style that 
Barbarossa’s critics attributed to him. To be sure, the depiction, by the sources examined 
above, of the League as a coniuratio that was capable of complex collective actions is 
confirmed by documentary evidence regarding its structure and activity, which were infused 
with principles of consultation, accountability and public responsibility. The League was built 
on a chain of collective oaths that were routinely confirmed: it was founded by agreements 
between city communes, which were then cemented by the oaths of their whole male 
population between the age of fifteen and sixty. Clauses of allegiance to the League were also 
inserted in the oaths that city consuls took upon entering office, in which they swore not to 
contradict the terms of the League, but to act for the common utility of all the men of the 
association. In turn, a college of rectors governed the League, who held short-time office, 
took an oath in which they also swore to act for the common utility, and also to share any 
goods they received during their mandate, since cases of corruption and duress officially 
disqualified their actions. The college of the rectors had its own seal and they met in 
assemblies where they took decisions by majority vote. Each of them came from one of the 
civitates of the League, each of which therefore had, at least in principle, equal representation. 
Finally the League did not only deal with the war against the emperor, but coordinated the 
collaboration and relations between its members more generally, including the resolution of 
disputes. Yet in their activity the rectors relied entirely on the goodwill of the members, 
though they could ban members from the association.97 
Boncompagno da Signa’s Liber de Obsidione Ancone is well known among scholars 
of political thought as one of the most convincing displays of Italian communal ideology, but 
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it has been often neglected by wider scholarship, and it has been virtually disregarded as the 
most compelling proof that the opposition against Barbarossa in Communal Italy came to be 
perceived as a particularly powerful example of resistance against bad princely government. 
Boncompagno was a teacher of rhetoric whom the Bolognese lawyer and knight Ugolinus 
Gosia commissioned the Liber de Obsidione Ancone to be publicly read in Ancona for the 
celebrations of his appointment as the city’s podestà (the executive officer, usually a 
foreigner, who gradually replaced the college of consuls from the end of the twelfth century) 
in 1201. Yet Boncompagno’s work recounted the heroic resistance against the imperial army 
that besieged Ancona during the reign of Barbarossa, in 1173, which was broken by in the 
intervention of the Lombard League.  
A podestà celebrating his appointment by commemorating an act of defiance by the 
city that he was about to rule against its ultimate ruler is quite remarkable in and of itself. 
Indeed, Boncompagno’s piece reviews the significance of Barbarossa’s Italian wars by stating 
that kings naturally tend to imitate rulers such as Nebuchadnezzar (the quintessential biblical 
tyrant), that without memory humans would regress to the state of irrational animals, and 
nothing would be undertaken according to law, but the will of anyone who happens to be in 
power would be the law and the weak would only be able to submit. ‘Therefore if any citizens 
[cives] is besieged by kings or princes, let them take the Anconitans as an example’.98 By 
sponsoring this work, Ugolinus clearly made a political statement, which wished to underline 
the distinction between his office as temporary rector of the city, and his intended approach to 
it, as opposed to those of a notorious emperor. At the same time, Boncompagno’s Liber does 
not reject imperial authority per se, and it actually introduces Ugolinus Gosia by noticing the 
close and traditional links between his family and the imperial court.99 
Regarding communal ideology, Boncompagno built his depiction of the siege of 1173 
around a series of speeches and vignettes, which portray the city’s resistance as a truly 
communal endeavour. The settings of the speeches are not ceremonial assemblies but genuine 
debates: the central speech of the work is delivered by an old man (who claims to have been a 
consul in the 1130s, around forty years before the siege) in the course of a very divided 
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assembly attended by the council of consuls and notables which governed the city, whom, 
however, Boncompagno described by using terms designating quality and expertise rather 
than mere social stratification (‘viri discreti et sapientes … quorum consilio civitas 
regebantur’).100 The old man succeeded to convince the assembly not to surrender to the 
imperial army, but the continuation of the siege worsened the hardships for the Anconitans, 
which brought further assemblies involving this time the entire Anconitan populus.101 It might 
be argued that a siege is an emergency situation and that those behaviours might not have 
reflected more mundane meetings. Yet in the introduction to the work, which describes the 
Anconitan invitation to the Bolognese Ugolinus in 1201, the latter asks an assembly of his 
fellow citizen composed by the podestà, the milites as well as the populus permission to 
accept that invitation, which they grant him collectively.102  
Boncompagno’s vignettes of the siege equally cut across Anconitan society, and they 
are gender inclusive too. The first vignette concerns a commoner widow called Stamira, who 
surpasses in dare all the defenders by setting fire to the war machines of the besiegers with an 
axe and a torch.103 Another vignette features a cathedral canon, who swims to the vessels that 
besieged the city by sea and causes havoc by cutting their anchors.104 Then a noblewoman 
carrying a baby offers her breast milk to a starving crossbowman who has no strength left to 
recharge his weapon but feels so ashamed at this that he springs to action.105 The 
expeditionary force sent by the League is led by a man and a woman: the man is formally in 
charge and the woman represents her minor son, but she is of far higher social ranking: he is 
an influential knight (miles) from the city of Ferrara, but she is the countess of Bertinoro, who 
is called here ‘speculum dominarum’, and they both deliver speeches to their troops, which 
comprised both members of the milites and of the populus.106 
The communal features of the League then came to the fore in episodes of contacts 
with the emperor that attracted widespread attention outside the empire, including the 
decisive Battle of Legnano of 1176. Many sources here considered mention that battle, from 
the English Ralph of Diceto, Robert of Torigni and Roger Howeden, to the southern Italian 
Romuald of Salerno, for example. Most simply ascribe the victory to the Lombardi, but 
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Romuald provided an overview of the dynamics of the battle. He recounted that it was 
decided by the foot-soldiers (who were usually commoners): the imperial cavalry (in this 
occasion the imperial army had no infantry) routed its Lombard counterpart (which was 
recruited from the local elite), but the Lombard’s ‘multitude of footsoldiers’ (pedestris 
multitudo) stood its ground in defence of the Milanese carroccio (a totemic emblem of the 
city), and it repelled imperial assaults, which gave time for the Lombard cavalry to rally.107 
Another prime and momentous episode of contact between the emperor and the 
League, which bore the imprint of Lombard political culture and touched the whole of 
Christendom, was the Peace of Venice of 1177, and once again the most valuable testimony 
comes from Romuald of Salerno, who eyewitnessed the core of that peace conference. 
Indeed, he was the chief negotiator of the king of Sicily, who, together with the League, in 
that occasion reached a truce with Barbarossa. The Peace of Venice was a truly international 
event, which lay and ecclesiastical authorities from across Western Christendom attended. As 
we have seen, for example, the account also survives of an anonymous English eyewitness, 
but it is far less detailed than that by Romuald. The Historia Ducum Veneticorum listed more 
than eight thousand participants, with some leading lay and ecclesiastical authorities being 
escorted by hundreds of people; they included a delegation jointly sent by the kings of 
England and France led by the Cistercian Abbot Hugh of Bonnevaux, who during the 
negotiations acted as mediator between the warring parties, and thus must have been 
acquainted with what it is about to be examined here.108  
Romuald recounted how, during the peace negotiations, which were presided by the 
pope, the leading representative of the emperor, Archbishop Christian of Mainz, gave three 
options to the delegation of the Lombards (whose members, incidentally, Romuald described 
as extraordinarily knowledgeable in public speaking to the people: ‘ad concionandum populo 
mirabiliter eruditi).109 One of the options simply asked to do justice to imperial rights, the 
second was to enforce the verdict (sententia) that the Bolognese judges had issued against the 
Lombard cities at the Diet of Roncaglia of 1158, and the third was to take as a model the 
situation as it was under the reign of Emperor Henry IV (d. 1106).110 To that the chief 
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negotiator of the League, the Milanese iudex and ex-consul Gerardo Cagapesto (who came 
from a well to do family, but whose name, which literally means ‘crush-a-shit’, betrays quite 
obvious non-aristocratic origins111), replied that they were ready to render the emperor his due 
as their lord, but, since Cagapesto represented a multitude of people and cities, he needed 
time to consult them.112 Even so Cagapesto openly refused to recognise the proceedings of the 
Diet of Roncaglia as a sententia, stating that it was rather an imperial order (imperatoriam 
iussionem), and, in any case, many members of the League had not attended that diet, though 
not because they were contumacious, and a sententia issued in absentia had no value; finally 
Cagapesto reasoned that there was no living memory of the reign of Henry IV, which 
therefore could not be reconstructed in a suitably detailed manner.113  
It was then Cagapesto’s time to make counterproposals. Rather than the reign of 
Henry IV, he suggested considering more recent ones, from that of Henry V to that of Conrad 
III [which entirely mirrored the position of the League as testified by the documentary 
evidence since its inception]; otherwise the assembly could rely upon the written settlements 
that the League and the emperor had reached a couple of years earlier through the mediation 
of Cremona, which had eventually come to nothing, leading to the Battle of Legnano; in the 
end it was this proposal that won the day, but that led to several days of discussions because 
the parties had different interpretations of that settlement, and although the Cremonesi (who 
had recently left the League for the emperor) were summoned to testify, no satisfactory 
conclusion could be reached. Pope Alexander III eventually suggested a six-year truce 
between the League of Barbarossa, and the parties kept it until the Peace of Constance of 
1183.114  
Of particular interest in Romuald’s account of the Peace of Venice are its references 
to the Diet of Roncaglia of 1158. As mentioned above, scholarship commonly regards its 
expansive definition of royal/imperial prerogatives as a milestone in the conceptualisation of 
public law in Western Europe. On the other hand, historians have generally ignored the 
reconstruction of the events offered by Romuald’s account, which, however, is fundamental 
in order to evaluate the Lombards’ perception of that momentous event, because imperial 
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supporters produced all the other surviving accounts of that diet.115 Not to mention that, in 
Romuald’s account, the Lombard perception of Roncaglia was delivered at such a Western 
Christendom-wide event as the Peace of Venice. Indeed, Romuald’s account lends support to 
Bisson’s recent remark that, in line with the common practices of the time, the Diet of 
Roncaglia was a convocation aimed at eliciting submission rather than a consultative 
assembly.116 On the other hand, those features of the Diet of Roncaglia are precisely the 
reason that Cagapesto openly gave to utterly reject its proceedings, suggesting that, in order to 
be acceptable, that diet should have been a consultative assembly instead, or that it should 
have followed judicial procedures, which, in his view, Barbarossa had ignored.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Scholarship has generally perceived the conflict between the League and Barbarossa in terms 
of nationhood, state formation, rejection by the Lombard cities of an external threat, or, 
indeed, of defence of petty local interests. Yet the sources here examined show that, in the 
decades straddling the turn of the twelfth century, that conflict acquired widespread fame 
throughout Christendom as a prime case of a successful uprising against what was perceived 
as a tyrannical ruler who wished to introduce a pervasive, intrusive and exploitative 
administration. Furthermore, with the exception of German sources, that uprising was 
generally portrayed in a favourable light, which is quite notable because many authors 
considered here were close to royal courts, which, in theory, should have shown sympathy for 
a fellow monarch. Given the lack of similar studies regarding other momentous central 
medieval revolts, it is impossible to evaluate accurately how exceptional was the fame of the 
League. It is very likely, however, that it was highly remarkable, possibly constituting the 
most widely known case of its kind at that time. Only further comparative research will be 
able to test that.   
The widespread knowledge and approval for the actions of the League were probably 
related to its close connections with the parallel conflict between empire and papacy, which 
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inevitably touched the whole of Christendom, and in which the papacy enjoyed the support of 
most rulers. Moreover, the geographical distance between the authors who covered the 
League outside the empire certainly made it less troublesome to approach it for them. The 
consistent criticism for the League found in German sources is a good opposite case in point, 
because it mirrored Barbarossa’s strong support there, which he harnessed for his Italian 
campaigns. 
The conflict between pope and emperor was not the only factor, though. The interest 
for the Lombard cities found in works such as those by Otto of Freising and John of Salisbury 
predated it. The other sources examined here did consider the conflict between League and 
emperor on its own terms, showing awareness of the fact that it was not fully coterminous 
with that between empire and papacy. In other words the role of the League in the conflict 
between Barbarossa and Alexander III served to multiply the audience for Barbarossa’s 
conflict with the League rather than supply it. 
Regarding the fame of the League, Bertran de Born’s likening of it to occurrences 
which were directed not only against royal, but also against comital power, and which took 
place in regions of France that were not particularly similar to Lombardy, suggests that the 
Lombard challenge against Barbarossa had become somewhat archetypal. It is significant that 
even some pro-imperial sources from within the empire, such as Acerbo Morena in Italy and 
Burchard von Ursberg in Germany, recognized that Barbarossa’s agents had behaved in an 
unacceptable way. That points to the existence of a contemporary sensitivity, shared across 
Christendom, regarding the boundaries of proper rulership and legitimate responses to their 
infringement. Indeed, the sources here examined show a notable terminological consistency 
in the way they portray the conflict and its causes, with key words being on one side libertas 
and on the other insolentia. The former represented traditional rights on self-rule, taxation and 
property holding, but also the very freedom from the kind of arbitrary and top down rule 
embodying insolentia.  
In effect, anyone across the Christian world of the central Middle Ages could relate to 
at least some of the themes touched upon by the League. Exploitative lordship, exacerbated 
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by the growth of administrative institutions that was typical of that age, as well as cases of 
resistance to it taking the shape of coniurationes, abounded.117 Just to give a couple of 
examples: under Emperor Henry IV Germany itself had experienced the Saxon Revolt against 
the emperor and his representatives, which had many parallels with the rebellion of the 
League. The rhetoric and motivations of the Saxons, whose protagonists were local nobles 
and free peasants, had equally featured complains of infringement of local customs and 
common rights, challenges to proprietary titles, cries of liberty, tyranny and accusations of 
imposing servility.118 On a very different scale, the Lombard case, and the way it was 
resolved, bore many affinities with the dispute that raged in the 1110s in the diocese of 
Autun, in central France, regarding the new ‘evil customs’ that the Duke of Burgundy had 
imposed over certain villages and persons, while the latter were supported by the bishop: 
eventually the parties drew up written statements regarding their positions, but the final 
settlement was reached by an assembly that featured representatives of each party, which 
judged against the duke on the basis of the available memory of his father’s practices and then 
wrote that settlement down.119 In turn, the constitutional role of the Peace of Constance recalls 
in many ways even the later case of the English Magna Carta.120 
The sources here examined show awareness of the distinctive urban features of the 
Lombard setting, of the rather unusual autonomy that its cities had achieved, and, to some 
extent, of regional power dynamics within Lombardy, but they do not use them in order to set 
apart the League from the rest of Western Europe. On the contrary, they rather portray that of 
the League in generic terms as a conflict between subjects, indeed, a people, against their 
ultimate ruler. Once again, the poems of Bertran de Born epitomise the non-specific character 
of the perception of the League particularly well, by likening it to occurrences in French 
regions that were not particularly similar to Lombardy. 
In actual fact, the Lombard communal setting probably greatly helped in evoking 
such a representation of the League as a collective endeavour. The German Otto of Freising 
used the very libertas – insolentia dichotomy to discuss the particular Lombard communal 
approach to politics, underlining its relatively inclusive attitude, social mobility, and implying 
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that, with that system, the Lombard city communes had achieved a degree of local success in 
avoiding insolentia. The English John of Salisbury represented the Lombard cities as prime 
examples of how the merits of the people (‘merita populi’) could stir princely regimes 
towards the greatest mildness or even make them superfluous. Those passages struck a cord 
with the latest scholarly debates among historians of the Italian city communes, who have 
sought to better contextualise the role of local elites in Lombard urban communal governance. 
After all, twelfth -century Lombard city communes did display a remarkable degree of social 
cohesion when compared to previous periods, but especially with later ones.  
The conflict between Barbarossa and the Lombard League tested those features of 
Lombard politics dramatically, but the League itself embodied them, and its conflict with the 
emperor, together with its close connection to that between empire and papacy, put a spotlight 
on them that attracted the attention of the whole of Christendom. In that respect, the League 
provided what was probably the best known practical case in point addressing some of the 
most distinctive political developments of the central middle ages directly: in the eyes of 
contemporary sources from outside the empire the League successfully stood against what 
was perceived as a despotic and exploitative growth of administrative institutions and, as 
Romuald’s portrayal of negotiations testifies, its arguments were based on principles of 
accountability, consultation and public responsibility. 
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